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The National Research Council’s (NRC) recent report, Scientific Research
in Education, issues an important call for increased scientific rigor within
educational research.  There is more at stake in the question of how to achieve
good, scientific educational research than just science and how it can best be
done in a community of educational researchers, however.  The meaning and
aims of education itself are at issue.
I set out here to delineate the implicit conception of education underlying
the NRC report, namely education as intervention.  I will show how the committee
conceives education as an instrumental intervention for solving social problems
and achieving specific predetermined goals.  Importantly, this understanding of
education allows certain approaches to scientific research to rise to the top as
most trustworthy and valuable.  Specific methodological approaches to studying
education, particularly causal analysis by random experiment, logically follow
as recommendations for examining education as intervention.  Suggesting that
educationists may not agree on this premise, I draw attention to one recently
emphasized alternative, the postmodern notion of education as bildung.  I will
show how education as bildung is incompatible with NRC proposals for
scientifically studying education.  This alternative and the lack of consensus on
the best conception of education calls into doubt the generalizability and
legitimacy of NRC supported research.
Education as Intervention for the NRC
For the NRC, “the advancement of scientific knowledge is facilitated when
investigators work with the same set of variables and theoretical constructs.”1
Successful scientific study is best achieved when a strong scientific culture forms
around a shared “set of norms and practices.”2   While not explicitly addressed
by the NRC, cultures typically form around a common view of the good life, and
here, good education.  It seems fitting, then, to expect the NRC to delineate this
educational vision prior to examining how best to study and promote it, let alone
seek consensus on investigating it.  Surprisingly, given that some chapter subtitles
seem to point in precisely this direction, there is very little explicit examination
of the NRC idea of education.  The most decisive description offered is the brief
statement midway through the report that “Education is a complex human
endeavor, ultimately aimed at enhancing students’ cognitive, civic, and social
learning and development.”3
As they leave their introductory comments and begin to make suggestions
for good research, a specific guiding ideal of education becomes clear.  The
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words used to describe education and the best studies of education are especially
revealing:  plan, implementation, treatment, usefulness, program, goal attainment,
efficiency, effectiveness, alleviation, predictability.  Similarly, the comparisons
made on the report’s very first page to the endeavors of reaching the Moon and
wiping out disease are suggestive of how education should be conceived.4   While
the NRC says that intervention is “one important focus of study,” I contend that
it is the focus of study for the NRC.5   Education is held as an intervention.
Indeed, we see the NRC slip easily from describing ‘education’ and ‘educational
programs’ to ‘interventions’.6   Closely tied to intervention is the notion of
education as instrumental—as a useful tool for achieving a specified goal.
People tend to view social problems as having instrumental solutions: the
status of the poor and unemployed can be ameliorated through welfare to work
programs, illiteracy can be assuaged by America Reads, and the like.  The NRC
employs this assumption without question insofar as it believes social problems
pose instrumental solutions which can be met through the intervention of
education.  Even in their first few pages, education, in terms of literacy and
numeracy,  is posed as necessary for achieving economic viability and job security,
thereby implying education as an instrumental solution to alleviating the social
ills of poverty and unemployment.7   Throughout the report, education is described
as an applied field, like medicine, which is aimed at solving practical problems.
The committee seems to lament that education, unlike medicine, has not produced
a Salk vaccine which solves “the practical problems of prolonging life and
reducing disease.”8   They describe medicine as having clear goals, admit that
education does not, and seem to wish that (and in fact operate as though) it did.9
While nearly all conceptions of education uphold some general goals, the
preciseness and predetermined nature of the goals described here is emphasized
in education conceived as intervention.
As intervention, the NRC is led to seek “what works”.  This is true both in
terms of education, where it is an efficient process for achieving specified goals,
and for education research, where methods are valued relative to their ability to
answer questions about what schooling approaches work best.10   This demand
has been reiterated by Grover Whitehurst, director of the Institute of Education
Sciences, who asks “what works best, for whom, under what circumstances?”11
A utilitarian view, education as ‘what works’ lends itself to a means-end rationality.
Within this framework, education becomes a means for implementing plans
geared at achieving specific goals and education research is tasked with
understanding this process of translation, applying theoretical models, and testing
which plans work best.  The goals are not thought of as emerging through the
practice of education.
It follows that education as instrumental for achieving predetermined goals
must bestow specific stores of knowledge, patterns of socialization, and ways of
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learning.  Education must intervene into the lives of children to confer knowledge
and behavior that would not otherwise develop for the purpose of alleviating
problems or meeting goals.  Educational research based on this notion strives to
determine which knowledge sets and patterns are inculcated and to what extent.
The NRC correctly notes that “Education interventions have costs—in money,
time, and effort: making a judgment on the effectiveness of a treatment is complex
and requires taking account of myriad factors.”12   Notice here the use of
‘treatment’ and ‘intervention’ and how they lead to the logic of cost effectiveness
and economic analysis. If educationists are trying to treat a specific problem,
they are led to inquire about efficiency in ameliorating the problem and efficacy
in targeting it.
Scientific Research on Education as Intervention
If we view education as a process of solving social problems through
effecting instrumental treatments, certain types of research seem most fitting to
assess the quality and accuracy of those interventions.
Education as intervention entails plans and treatments prespecified by
teachers and educational scholars.  Because the intervention is externally chosen,
designed, and directed, it is more capable of being directly investigated than
some other notions of education.  This possibility of direct investigation allows
the NRC to claim in their core principles that all scientific endeavors “use methods
that permit direct investigation of the questions” and do so empirically.13
Moreover, empirical questions “must be posed in such a way that it is possible to
test the adequacy of alternative answers through carefully designed and
implemented observations.”14   Here, education as intervention is studied by
altering one specific element of the instrument, a concretely identifiable aspect,
and by observing this alternative intervention.  The goals attained mark a precise
end to the targeted intervention.
The NRC claims that these end points and, indeed the entire physical and
social world, can be objectively observed and agreed upon by multiple
observers.15   It makes sense that education as an externally conceived plan of
intervention can be observed and agreed upon by many stakeholders, but it is
not so clear that the successful achievement of predetermined ends is so
objectively measurable, as I will argue later.  Nonetheless, education as
intervention with prespecified ends lends itself to pre- and post-test design.
Intervention implies that the desired state is absent at a clear point before
implementation and achieved at a precise moment following completion of the
instrumental plan.  This absence and achievement can be measured by such a
design.  Furthermore, education is treated as objectifiable, as a fixed object rather
than a growing and changing process.  Given science’s, especially the natural
sciences’, past history with objectification, the NRC risks objectifying, and
thereby reifying, education as intervention.  Additionally, Whitehurst’s proposals
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risk a cycle of reification: “customers” ask for research that works, the government
applauds and funds this type of research, and it becomes the only type of research
acceptable to customers.16   In this cycle, some valuable aspects of education
may be lost.  Admittedly, for the NRC, this is not a problem for they presume
that education is so clearly understood in this way that it doesn’t even need to be
described as such.
Additionally, if education is studied in terms of its ability to effect specific
results, it makes sense for the NRC to describe good research as capable of
having predictable results.  Intervention entails seeking specific results and mass
study of intervention would appropriately search for patterns in the ways that
those results are achieved.  Similarly, intervention as a performed plan lends
itself to being replicated, as does the study of such intervention.  As mentioned
above, the intervention implemented and the ends sought can be agreed upon by
multiple researchers.  Replication, in one sense the NRC identifies, is the reliability
and consistency of the assessments and measurements of the situation from the
standpoint of various observers.17   At the more complex level NRC names,
replication is the ability to achieve similar conclusions when repeating an
investigation in multiple contexts.18   Replication is desired across studies of
education because it gets at the cash value of education as intervention—the
certainty that it will produce the same results when implemented multiple times
in multiple places.
Education as objectively identifiable, as tested by altering the intervention,
as having prespecified goals and end points, and as having predictable results all
point to causal analysis by random experiment as the most fitting approach to
education conceived as intervention.  Whitehurst makes this explicit: “Questions
of efficacy and effectiveness, or what works, are causal, and are addressed most
rigorously with randomized field trials…The only sure method for determining
the effectiveness of education programs and practices.”19   And it is with this
random experiment that the NRC sides.  While admitting that it may not always
be a feasible or ethical approach, they hold experimentation “is still the best
methodological route.”20   Indeed it follows as such from the questions they pose,
or, more accurately, the assumptions they hold, regarding the nature of education.
Disagreement
The NRC charges educational researchers with having failed to forge
consensus on research quality and proposes a more robust scientific community
geared toward consensus building.21   While consensus can be an admirable goal
at times, the committee overlooks the fact that consensus regarding educational
research is nearly impossible given the varying understanding of the object being
investigated.  Many people may agree that schooling, rather than education,
should be instrumental.  Nearly all would agree that schooling needs to install
certain skills, like reading, in order to ameliorate social problems.  But when it
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comes to education, many scholars envision it as something far more deep and
wide ranging than just intervention.
Some discussions of methodological approach are based on a similar
dichotomy of education conceived as isolated and quantifiable and education as
inseparable from the larger world and best depicted descriptively.  Rather than
method, the point of contention may actually be which underlying conception of
education is upheld.  So while debates in journals like Educational Researcher
which have responded to the report may be couched in terms of methodological
approach, something far more significant may be at stake.  The issue may actually
be which conception of education is the most appropriate object of study for
these approaches (typically broken up into quantitative and qualitative), rather
than which one more accurately and completely addresses one specific conception
of education as intervention.  As we have seen, the NRC notion of education
leads to support for a quantitative, experimental research method.  Qualitative
researchers, like Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre, who detect this one-sided support,
may actually be up in arms over the appropriate notion of education rather than
the best approach to studying it.22   Their arguments on epistemology and perceived
difficulty of study may actually be concerned with education-related visions of
the good life and the corresponding complexity with which it is understood.
One alternative conception of education that is in stark contrast to that of
the NRC’s is education as bildung.  I set myself here to describing this alternative
and juxtaposing it to the NRC guidelines for examining education.  I do not
necessarily endorse education as bildung, but use it as a foil for revealing many
problems with the NRC report.  From the start, I should note that bildung has a
long and complicated history, primarily arising out of the German neo-humanist
tradition where it was conceived as self-development, building rational autonomy,
and learning to mutually recognize the other.  As an understanding of education,
it has taken various forms and emphasized different things throughout the years.
Interestingly, education as bildung was forcefully abandoned or narrowly
maintained for the elements which could be empirically examined under the
empirical drives of the 1960s, which display some resemblance to those of the
NRC.23
While there are many different conceptions of bildung that parallel its
long and tumultuous history, I draw here on those most recently theorized in the
context of a postmodern, globalizing world, rather than more modernist notions
of bildung as the individual solely developing rational autonomy.  Several
educational scholars and philosophers have recently been theorizing bildung in
the contemporary postmodern world.  These current undertakings show that
bildung continues to be a viable, though contested and changing, understanding
of education.
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Education as Bildung
A postmodern understanding of bildung, informed by philosophical
hermeneutics, entails a lifelong process of self-development through the
cultivation of the student’s mind and soul.  The self is embedded in human tradition
and education involves coming to terms with this tradition.  The self being made,
however, remains incomplete and constantly in the process of creative self-
transformation.  Insofar as it is a continual process, it lacks a predefined, specific
goal or recognizable end point.  In fact, it is not geared toward extrinsic goals;
rather the ends-in-view which it does uphold always arise out of navigating a
situation or interpretation.  Bildung is the proper way of developing one’s natural
talents that are linked to the human tradition, not by mastering it, but by
participating in it.
Bildung includes but surpasses just educating for knowledge, skills, or
socialization.  Rather than the measurable acquisition of knowledge sets, it is a
process of learning how to seek, interpret, and produce knowledge, or more
precisely, understanding.  But, importantly, it is how we stand in relation to this
knowledge, as ironic, as cognizant of its revisability and of its scope which exceeds
our control and ourselves.24   Bildung nurtures a more pragmatic knowledge that
goes beyond this factual knowledge—an understanding, a “know-how” that
successfully leads the student, though in undetermined ways, by cultivating the
inner life informed by environmental conditions, conversations with others, and
differences amongst individuals.25   This involves a self who actively participates
in transformation using knowledge of history, the successes and failures of past
adaptations, and the current matrix of language.26   Hence, bildung involves
learning how to envision and recreate the world and one’s self differently; it is
constructing a future informed by the past and present.  Bildung entails becoming
rational, but not naively autonomous and disconnected from others as was the
case with the more modernist sense of bildung.  One becomes adept at rigorous
ways of thinking and interpreting.  Education is learning to see the world and its
parts coherently and contextually through exercising complex rationality,
especially, in partnership with other learners.
Education as bildung provides an experience for understanding how one’s
life is tied to others, others who are different from oneself.  It entails actually
encountering and engaging with what is other and, thereby, being social. Rather
than seeing the other as strange and foreign, the role of education is to make the
student’s familiar world seem strange. 27    Bildung involves becoming alienated
through encountering the other.  This jarring experience can reveal the contingency
of one’s living, the uncertainty of the language one uses to understand oneself,
the effect of the traditions which flow through one, and the hermeneutical ways
in which meaning can be made between unique individuals demarcated by
difference.  Indeed one’s self understanding and identity are at stake.
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It is in the ‘fusing of horizons’ when engaging with others that
understanding of human universals is revealed, though only partially and
tentatively.  The focus here is on openness to relationships and language.  Bildung
is learning in  such a way that the student keeps herself open to something other
than herself.  This is best accomplished through dialogue premised on openness
toward who we are and how we constitute ourselves through engaging with others.
Through dialogue we may come to the truth of a matter, possibly even an
understanding of universal aspects of being human.
Bildung is not something we use for ourselves or others.  We participate
in it, but do not direct or control it.  While it may produce good people or laborers,
bildung itself is intrinsically valuable.  Describing the intrinsic value of Gadamer’s
bildung, David Blacker notes,
This is not to say that economic well-being is unimportant, nor
community nor democracy—nor even to diminish these goods.  Not
at all.  It is merely to suggest that there is at least some part of
education that has reasons of its own, some part that is worthwhile
not because of the commodities it procures nor even the sorts of
citizens it creates.  It is also to suggest that we are dangerously
close to losing that vision, even as our need for it grows ever more
urgent.28
  Having been written before publication of the NRC report, we can only imagine
that Blacker’s sense of urgency would only be strengthened now.
Bildung as Incompatible with NRC Research Suggestions
As I hope it is becoming clear, education as bildung differs substantially
from education as intervention.  Insofar as the research recommendations that
the NRC suggests follow from education as intervention, these suggestions are
incompatible with studying education as bildung.  Not only are the NRC proposals
nonsensical for helping educators better understand bildung, but they also risk
erasing bildung and other viable alternative conceptions of education.  Because
the NRC report, No Child Left Behind, Education Sciences Reform Act, and the
Castle bill together will determine the majority of research agendas and funding
in the upcoming years, their shared, narrow conception of education may be
enforced as the best or only notion.
Unlike intervention, bildung is not directed toward attaining specific
extrinsic goals, such as solving particular social problems.  Neither can it fully
be portrayed using the logic of means to satisfy predetermined ends.  Goals arise
out of the experience of bildung and are fulfilled within the practice, but bildung
continually pushes beyond them.  Because of this, bildung is incompatible with
randomized experiment and particularly with a pre- and post-test design.  The
goals sought to be measured in the post-test cannot be selected beforehand for
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this presumes an impossible knowledge of how social situations will play out
and unethical assumptions about the differences of others.  The composition and
extent of each child’s self-development will also vary, making determinations of
post-test status highly difficult.
Furthermore, bildung doesn’t satisfy the NRC’s aspiration to study one
isolated factor of learning at a time, nor, from the perspective of bildung, is this
a desirable way of understanding education.  The NRC contends that good science
requires precisely specified and adequately measured concepts and variables.29
An accompanying belief, the NRC holds that the ambiguity of terms like
‘development’ and ‘learning’ can be removed through developing a complex
measurement system which connects concepts.  Such connections can only be
made sensical when guided by the very notion of good education that may be
problematically defining them.  While I do not doubt that certain approaches to
education can help us better understand the meaning of these terms, bildung
scholars would argue that these terms always remain elusive in that they can
never be completely captured, nor do they coalesce into a totally recognizable,
and therefore empirically measurable, form.  These terms themselves, as symbols
as well as the objects they represent, are constantly changing and may simply be
non-empirical in certain respects.  This is not to say that bildung cannot be
rigorously studied, rather that the variables worthy of closer attention may be
difficult to specify, especially as objectively from outside the process, and
measured in the way the NRC demands.
In a similar vein, it may be difficult for observers to agree upon what they
see let alone for them to fully see development within an individual student.
Meeting the NRC goal of objective consensus by researchers who primarily
stand outside of the particular educational context is nonsensical when juxtaposed
to bildung.  The NRC has not paid enough attention to how the subject represents
herself to the expert.  This is often overlooked in controlled experiments which
try to fit people’s responses into pre-decided categories and don’t allow for the
expert and subject to be co-partners in arriving at these ‘objective’ categories.
The objective consensus reached is imposed on the student and on the
understanding of education.  Some qualitative researchers who were repulsed
by the NRC suggestion that difficult variables may be so measured and objectively
agreed upon (read quantitative methodology), may actually have been expressing
their understanding of education as more complex, dynamic, and elusive, rather
than simply contesting method.
Within the research procedure of selecting the variables of interest,
identifying, and measuring them within the student, the NRC takes an interesting
stance on the role of teachers.  From the view of bildung, it appears that teachers
are intimately engaged with the developing student and may have the best insight
into the student’s self-understanding and relations with classmates and the human
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tradition.  These teachers have a unique view of the students’ development as
co-participants in the educational process.  They are better able to interpret the
situation and to make suggestions for how it can be improved.  Teachers then
should be at the fore of educational research and should be assigned more
credibility than researchers from without who come to the classroom for relatively
brief periods of time to (exam)ine the students.  While the NRC admits that in
some educational investigations, the observer may need to be engaged with,
rather than distanced from, the student and activity of learning, the teacher should
be second to the researcher.30   In some instances where the teacher may have a
stake in the research, teachers are permitted to work in partnership with the
researchers.31   The authority and legitimacy of the research comes, however,
from the outside, objective, methodologically rigorous, researcher.
Another conflict between bildung and NRC supported research is the unit
of analysis.  Bildung, and the study of bildung, are interested in the socially
situated individual, though continually conscious of this individual’s relation to
the larger environment and other students.  For the NRC, this sample, the
individual, is too small and ungeneralizable; it would fail to “yield findings that
replicate and generalize across studies.”32   Because it fails to satisfy this basic
principle, bildung risks efficiency and evades the logic of cost effectiveness for
it is not concerned with producing general programs that can be employed en
masse.  The only type of generalization that bildung seeks is tentative
interpretations which generalize to the human condition.
The incompleteness and complexity of bildung calls for diverse ways of
studying it.  Bildung cannot be explained or represented in simple, or even
relatively complex, causal relations as the NRC desires.33   The embedded self,
coming to terms with and participating in the human tradition cannot be reduced
to elementary causal structure.  Bildung resides in and promotes habitation of
the middle space between cause and effect, a space of interpretation and
compromise.  This is not to say that bildung is free from causal relations, but
rather that bildung moves beyond cause and effect as polar ends and therefore
cannot be mapped out under such terms.
It may be the case that education as bildung may not be an appropriate
object of scientific study; perhaps it is more aligned with an interpretive,
hermeneutical analysis.  This possibility calls into question the very assumption
that educational researchers and scholars should become more scientific in their
approach to and understanding of education.  For if education is understood
differently than intervention, the call for a scientific approach may not be
appropriate in the first place.
In sum, the lack of consensus on the best notion of education and my
example of bildung as a viable alternative call into doubt the appropriateness,
generalizability, and legitimacy of NRC supported research which adheres to a
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narrowly interventionist and instrumental understanding of education.  This paper
suggests that the NRC call for good research may actually be narrowing the
understanding of good education or education worthy studying, and therefore
worth backing with policy and funding.  This narrowing has been implemented
by a non-elected committee and largely without public debate and deliberation.
Not only researchers, but educational theorists, teachers, and parents should be
alarmed and should strive to work out the proper relationship between viable
conceptions of education and their corresponding research approaches.
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